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nvestors are anticipating the unravelling of the 21 July 2011 ‘solution’. We argue that the EFSF 
cannot work as intended but if it were registered as a bank – which would give it access to 
unlimited ECB re-financing in case of emergency – the generalised breakdown of confidence could 
be stopped while leaving the management of public debt under the supervision of the finance ministers. 
The ECB could still manage liquidity as the ‘EFSF-bank’ would be subject to the same rules as all 
other banks and because the ECB would accept only good quality collateral from it. Moreover, the ECB 
could then stop its purchases of peripheral government bonds immediately. 
Canaries used to be kept in coal mines because they die faster than humans when exposed to 
dangerous gases. When the birds stopped singing, miners knew that it was time to prepare 
for an emergency. 
Greece, as it turns out, was the Eurozone’s canary. It was nevertheless resuscitated, and a 
small rescue mechanism was set up to revive a further canary or two – but beyond this the 
warning was ignored. The miners kept on working. They convinced themselves that this was 
the canary’s problem. 
A Greek warning 
The problems of Greece should have been recognised as the first manifestation of a general 
problem, namely that the global crisis was spreading to public debt as capital markets 
refused to refinance excessive levels of public debt, especially in the Eurozone, whose 
members can no longer rely on central bank support. 
This has become particularly evident since the July 2011 European Council – the meeting that 
was supposed to end the crisis by settling the Greek case with a mixture of generous long-
term financing at low interest rates and some private sector rescheduling and restructuring. 
The Greek public might not appreciate it, but it has received preferential treatment from the 
EU. With the decisions taken at the July European Council, Greece will essentially have all its 
financing needs for the next decade arranged and is assured of paying less than 4% on the 
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new debt it is incurring.1 The two other countries with a programme, Ireland and Portugal, 
will have similarly low interest rates and loans with a longer maturity than now, but they are 
still expected to face the test of the markets in a few years’ time. 
The debt fears reach the core 
But while Greece, Ireland, and Portugal obtained lower rates for their official long-term 
financing, Spain and Italy experienced a surge in their borrowing costs. Before the 
intervention of the ECB they were paying more than 6% for ten-year money. 
It is clear that these countries cannot be expected to provide billions of euros in credits to 
Greece (and Portugal and Ireland) at approximately 3.5% when they are themselves paying 
so much more. Even France has come under market pressure as doubts have arisen over the 
country’s ability to deal with both its actual and contingent liabilities. Europe’s leaders 
wanted to be generous to Greece, but the supply of cheap funds is limited. Not everybody 
can be served this way. 
The EFSF was designed for a peripheral crisis 
In particular, the Eurozone rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) simply 
does not, and will not, have enough funds to undertake the massive bond purchases 
required to stabilise markets. It was sized to provide emergency financial support only to 
small peripheral countries such as Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. 
Moreover, the structure of the EFSF makes it vulnerable to a domino effect. 
•  The rules of the EFSF imply that a country that encounters financial difficulties and asks 
for support from the EFSF can ‘step out’, i.e. no longer provide guarantees for any further 
debt issuance by the EFSF (See Art. 2(7) of the EFSF Framework Agreement).2 
•  Even if it is not explicitly regulated, it can be expected that a country facing high 
borrowing costs (as in the case of Italy and Spain if rates stay at crisis level) will step out 
as guarantor and only the core Eurozone members would remain to back the EFSF. 
At this point, the debt burden on the core countries would become unbearable. 
Dangers of applying the periphery solution to the core 
This implies that a larger EFSF is not the solution; if anything it could accelerate the fall of 
the dominoes. The position of the French government – that the EFSF should be increased – 
does not make sense even from a narrow French point of view because financial markets 
have understood this risk and are driving up borrowing costs for France – the core country 
most in danger of losing its AAA rating.  But if France loses its triple-A status and then has to 
‘step out’ of the EFSF, only Germany (and some of its smaller neighbours) would be left to 
carry the whole burden. This would not only be politically unacceptable but also 
economically impossible – the Italian government debt alone is equivalent to the entire GDP 
of Germany. 
How this drives the markets 
In early August 2011, the domino effect started to kick in because financial markets do not 
wait for country after country to be downgraded; they tend to anticipate the endgame, or at 
least one potential scenario, namely the unravelling of the entire EFSF/ESM structure. 
Markets were caught between three, seemingly inconsistent constraints: 1) little chance of a 
                                                      
1 See (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/123978.pdf) 
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sizeable increase in the borrowing capacity of the EFSF; 2) little chance of the introduction of 
Eurobonds; and 3) a great reluctance on the part of the ECB to engage in large-scale 
purchases of financially troubled governments’ bonds. 
The bank-government-debt snare 
As usual, banks are the weakest link. They create negative feedback loops and accelerate the 
transmission of the domino effect.  There are two reasons for this: 
•  Many banks hold large amounts of government debt; 
•  Their credit rating usually falls along with that of their own sovereign. 
This implies that anyone expecting a country’s downgrade would not only be selling 
government securities but also its bank shares. This, in turn, increases the cost of capital for 
the banks, making them even weaker.  Moreover, even stronger banks – which see their own 
share prices falling and credit-default spreads widening – react by refusing to provide the 
other banks with interbank liquidity.  The breakdown in the interbank market, in turn, leads 
to a breakdown of the credit circuit, which kills growth. 
This was the dynamic that led to the severe recession experienced after the Lehman 
bankruptcy. 
It is now apparent that capital markets are anticipating the potential for a doomsday 
scenario, with the economy falling abruptly into recession as the interbank market breaks 
down and public debt problems are expected to grow. Unfortunately, these expectations will 
materialise unless the breakdown of the interbank market is addressed immediately. 
What needs to be done?  
To avoid the worst scenario, the Eurozone needs a massive infusion of liquidity. Given that 
the existing cascade structure of the EFSF is part of the problem, the solution cannot be a 
massive increase in its size. Rather, the EFSF could simply be registered as a (special) bank in 
Luxembourg with access to re-financing by the ECB in a case of emergency. The EFSF, which 
we would prefer to call the European Monetary Fund (EMF) would then have access to ECB 
funding as do other banks, for which the central bank acts as a lender of last resort.  
Adjustment funding and help for debt restructuring would be carried out by the EMF with 
the financial endowment already decided. Smaller secondary market intervention in case of 
limited liquidity gaps could be funded in the same way. However, in case of a big liquidity 
crunch, the EMF could access ECB facilities by borrowing against the government bonds it is 
purchasing as collateral. Assuming that the ECB insists on the top quality of the assets it 
takes for collateral—as for instance assured by a high rating—it would ensure that it only 
lends in case of a liquidity crunch and not when a country suffers insolvency.3  The decision 
to intervene to buy national government bonds would be taken by the EMF, based on expert 
assessments and under the supervision by Finance Ministers and not, as de facto at present, 
by the ECB, whose task is not to determine fiscal policy in specific countries, but to look after 
price and financial stability for the euro area as a whole.   
Moreover, the EMF would also be the proper place to formulate and monitor the 
conditionality that would have to go hand in hand with any EMF intervention, including 
buying bonds on the secondary markets. At present this is done implicitly by the ECB, which 
                                                      
3 Cases of insolvency would have to be handled by the EMF without ECB help by giving adjustment 
help and, as a measure of last resort, facilitating debt restructuring. The limited market borrowing 
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uses its SMP to pressure the Italian government into reforms and fiscal adjustment.   
However, there is no representation of the European tax payers on the Governing Council of 
the ECB, which might have a tendency to be overly concerned about instability in financial 
markets and have too little regard for the interests of taxpayers. 
The ECB would still be able to control liquidity developments for the entire euro area 
because once financial markets have returned to normal it could simply stop its policy of full 
allotment.  At this point any refinancing by the EMF would simply crowd out financing to 
other banks and thus not increase area-wide liquidity. 
Backstopping the EFSF via the ECB—i.e. creating an EMF – would have the advantage over 
the current mess in that it leaves the management of public debt problems in the hands of the 
finance ministries, and provides them with the liquidity backstop that is needed when there 
is a generalised breakdown of confidence. In a crisis of confidence the fundamental problem 
of banks and governments is always one of liquidity. This is exactly when a lender of last 
resort is most needed.  
The ECB is the only institution that can provide the required ‘lending of last resort’ quickly 
and in convincing quantities. It would of course be much better if the ECB did not have to 
‘bail out’ the European rescue mechanism, but in this case one has to choose between two 
evils. Even a massive increase in the ECB’s balance sheet (which, if the US experience is any 
guide, will not lead to inflation) constitutes a lesser evil than a breakdown of the Eurozone 
financial system. 
What are the alternatives? 
The dangers of introducing political union without democratic legitimacy 
Another solution touted by some has been to establish joint and several liability for euro area 
countries’ debt by introducing Eurobonds. The danger here is that holding tax-payers fully 
and unconditionally liable for spending decisions taken in other countries would most likely 
turn into a poison pill for EMU. Political resistance against EMU would rise in the stronger 
countries, eventually leading to a probable break-up of EMU. Moreover,  if the issuance of 
Eurobonds were limited to a part of national debt (say only 40-60 % of GDP as proposed), 
highly indebted countries would immediately be forced into a debt restructuring as they 
could no longer find buyers for the part only guaranteed nationally.4 Moreover, this 
approach would require a change in the EU treaties and would probably not be compatible 
with the German constitution. 
Another variant of Eurobonds would be for all euro area countries to provide a ‘joint and 
several’ guarantee for the EFSF. This would have still have most of the political 
disadvantages mentioned above, but at least it would not create the additional problems of 
the blue/red bond proposal.   
Whatever the variant: Eurobonds can only make sense in a political union and even then 
only when debt levels are low.5 When starting debt levels are so high that the markets 
suspect a debt overhang Eurobonds would amount to a large transfer of risk and of course 
strong expectations that future accumulations of debt will be treated in the same way. 
                                                      
4 It could be different if in case of default part of the bonds—say that consistent with a 60% debt 
ratio—were guaranteed by the community of euro area states (through a respective privision in the 
b o n d  c o v e n a n t ) .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  g u a r a n t e e  w o u l d  o n l y  k i c k  i n  i n  c a s e  o f  d e f a u l t  w h i l e  m a r k e t  
participants would have a better idea of the recovery value. 
5 The Federal government of the newly created US assumed the debt of the founding states because 
that debt had been incurred fighting for a common cause. This is certainly not the case in Europe 
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No silver bullet 
Bringing EMU back to safe ground will of course only succeed if debt and deficits are 
reduced substantially. The financial crisis has clearly demonstrated that excessive debt loads 
and new deficits cannot be financed in anything but extremely benign markets. Countries 
that accumulate excessive debt will inevitably experience their ‘Minsky moment’, when the 
rolling of this debt becomes impossible. For a stable EMU a long-term programme of debt 
reduction is a conditio sine qua non. However, debt reduction takes time, hence the need for an 
effective crisis management mechanism along the lines sketched out above. One without the 
other will not work, and EMU will fail. 
Our proposal will certainly dissatify the purists who regard EMU as the re-birth of the gold 
standard. For the purists, our proposal amounts to a thinly veiled monetary financing of 
government debt. We would respond by saying that in the real world of today a pure gold 
standard-like arrangement will not work. In today’s environment, the central bank needs to 
look after financial stability, which means that it needs to assume the role of a lender of last 
resort to banks and—because of the bank-government-debt nexus described above—also 
governments. The question is not whether, but how this role is performed. 
 
 